Professor Erik Gartzke of the Columbia University, will give a lecture at PRIO followed by a discussion. It is widely accepted that liberal polities are less war prone, if only in pairs.
Two traditions within liberalism offer arguments about achieving peace. Where Kant and his intellectual descendants emphasize constraints on the use of force (democracy, trade, and intergovernmental organizations), another school exemplified by Angell focuses on factors likely to transform state willingness (capitalism and common interests). While studies of the democratic peace have exhausted many possible complements or alternatives accounts, research has yet to thoroughly assess this second perspective. I review, revise, and expand upon Angell's claims, using the bargaining perspective to identify processes that are likely to lead to a reduction in disputes, either by removing the motives for conflict, or by facilitating diplomatic bargains in lieu of violence. Using a standard statistical model of liberal peace, I find that variables representing national wealth, global capitalism, and similar state interests are highly significant. In fact, the troika of liberal economic and interest variables appear to supplant Kant's triad as predictors of peace.