In general the thesis focus theoretically on the problem of decommissioning of guerrilla groups before, during and after a peace treaty has been signed. Different aspects of this problem are illustrated by using game theory. More specifically do I consider the case of Northern Ireland, and the problem with decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army. The analysis is three-folded:
How do the use of threats influence the outcome of a negotiation process? An analysis of the situation between Great Britain, the UUP and Sinn Fein/the IRA before the all-party talks started.
How is it possible make an agreement self-enforcing, and furthermore how is it possible to verify that the actors keep their end of the bargain? An analysis of the Good Friday Agreement.
The problems of assuming unitary actors in game theory. A thorough analysis of the distinction between Sinn Fein and the IRA, and the problems the IRA faces concerning internal hard-liners.
