Who Will Defend Europe?

For nearly three years, Europe has experienced a devastating war between two of its major powers. Yet, peace is taken for granted by so many Europeans as the natural state of affairs on the continent that efforts to prioritize defence and resilience is resisted by populist politicians and rejected by deep cohorts of voters. This is exactly the proposition advanced by this well-researched book, and the author can feel satisfied that the position that he has maintained for many years against disparaging criticism and accusations of alarmism is now accepted by the political mainstream as a reasonable response to an obvious threat. Yet Giles, who describes himself as a ‘professional explainer of Russia’ (p. 24), is also frustrated with the translation of too many political proclamations of urgency and gravity of security challenges into too little action. One of his key arguments is about the inevitability of reduction of the US contribution to European defence, and the forthcoming resetting of strategic priorities by the second Trump administration, presumed by Giles to be ‘entirely out of kilter with US interests’ (p. 61), which may deepen and accelerate this disengagement beyond worst worries in London and Berlin – and best hopes in Moscow. Building up the European deterrence posture is indeed a ‘race against time’ (p. 210), and a ceasefire in Ukraine, which is far more probable at the end of 2024 than at the middle, when the book was sent to print, can cut the estimates of time available for this sprint much shorter than a decade. Giles concludes that it is not too late, perhaps against his own better judgement.