The Russian Way of Deterrence

The thrust of this thoroughly researched book – focussing due attention on the particular features of Russia’s application of coercion – may appear less urgent now than it was three years ago, when it went into the long process of academic publishing. Persistent Russian attempts to deter the Western coalition from expanding support to Ukraine in the course of the long war have energized research efforts aimed at examining this fluid combination of direct threats, subtle dissuasions and aggressive disinformation. Adamsky’s claim for a ‘trailblazing effort’ (p. 6) in uncovering the deep roots of nuclear brinkmanship and information warfare in Russian strategic culture still rings true, but his trail has become an avenue as a lot of effort is presently invested in assessing the real content of Putin’s posturing and bragging by veteran analysts (Lawrence Freedman’s contribution deserves a special mention) and by no small a cohort of younger investigators. Their assessments yield conclusions that may question Adamsky’s view on nuanced and advanced sophistication of Russian conceptualization of deterrence strategy. Moscow practitioners executing this strategy may be surprised to know about their ‘inclination toward holistic-dialectical thinking’ (p. 130), but in fact, Russian methods of coercing the adversaries have become cruder and blunter than they had been prior to the war. Instead of calculated and coordinated moves across various domains, envisaged by Adamsky, Western allies have to process a cacophony of disinformation, to curtail multiple awkward attempts at sabotage and cyber-hacking, and to call Putin’s bluffs without provoking him to break the nuclear taboo. The degradation of Russian strategic culture determines the brutalization of coercion but makes risk management progressively harder for Western policymakers.