Putin’s Warpath Goes Through Arctic

Russia’s war against Ukraine is stuck in a rigid deadlock. The prospect of agreeing on a ceasefire, which had appeared within reach a couple of weeks ago, has, however, become distant and blurred.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is not procrastinating or bargaining, he deliberately persists with unfeasible conditions while accepting concessions as a matter of routine (Re: Russia, March 27).

From the Black Sea to the Arctic

This uncompromising position led to little progress gained from the tri-lateral U.S.-Russia-Ukraine talks in Saudi Arabia on reducing hostilities in the Black Sea (Carnegie Politika, March 27). An agreement should have been possible because Ukraine consistently refrains from attacking tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” with its naval drones, but Moscow demands more concessions while refusing to cease missile strikes on Odesa (seeEDM;Novaya gazeta Europe, March 28). At the end of the week, Putin expeditiously shifted the focus of political maneuvering from the Black Sea to the Arctic.

The International Arctic Forum, held in Murmansk on March 27 with the theme, “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue,” has previously served as a meeting place for international stakeholders, but it has now been reduced to a podium for Putin’s rhetoric (seePanorama, March 21;Izvestiya, March 28). Russia is excluded from all formats of international cooperation, and its partnership with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) yields few benefits. Consequently, Putin made a rare admission that the model for developing the Northern Sea Route was unworkable (Kommersant, March 27). He did not mention that the production of natural gas was fast contracting and Gazprom’s market value was sinking (Lenta.ru;RBC, March 28). In Putin’s mind, these economic setbacks are of scant significance compared to the main source of Russia’s strength in the Arctic — the Northern Fleet.

The Northern Fleet

The highlight of Putin’s visit was the launch of the newly built nuclear submarine Perm, armed with hypersonic Tsirkon missiles (TopWar.ru, March 27). This missile was designed as an anti-ship armament for various naval platforms, but Putin described it as a strategic weapon system (Interfax, March 27). His usual bragging contained a hint of interest in resuming conversations on strategic stability with the United States, which Moscow had rejected since the start of its war against Ukraine as incompatible with the stormy atmosphere of confrontation (Valdai Club, March 18). The Kremlin may be skeptical about U.S. President Donald Trump’s ideas for reducing nuclear arsenals, but it is keen to open a channel of communication on strategic nuclear matters, where Moscow and Washington, D.C. can discuss issues as equals (RIAC, February 12;MK.ru, March 3).

Engaging Trump

This traditionally pivotal channel could be part of a broader dialogue on Russia-U.S. cooperation, in which Putin attempts to engage Trump despite the apparent failure to bring his war against Ukraine to an end (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 23). Joint ventures in the Arctic are offered as a lucrative opportunity, even if Russia insists on exercising complete control over such projects, which is a significant disincentive for potential PRC investors (Vedomosti, March 27). Putin described Trump’s plans for gaining control over Greenland as “serious” and asserted that Russia had no objections to such a reconfiguration of sovereign rights in the Arctic (RBC, March 27). What makes this hypothetical proposition practically useful for Russia is the apparent escalation of tensions between the United States and Denmark, which has the potential of deepening discord in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (seeEDM, January 21;Svoboda.org, March 12;Interfax, March 28).

Pressure on Northern Europe

Expecting these tensions to deepen, Russia is putting pressure on the Northern European states, targeting Norway with a demarche against its alleged “militarization” of the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) archipelago (seeEDM, March 20;24TV.ua, March 26). The Nordic states, together with the Baltics, are, however, the strongest proponents of collective defense build-up and supporters of Ukraine, and Putin’s threats to Finland and Sweden are only reinforcing their resolve (Fontanka.ru, March 27). Moscow is alarmed by European plans for rebuilding military strength and the defense industrial base, in which Ukraine figures not as a net recipient but as a significant contributor (TopWar.ru, March 27). Russian designs for splitting trans-Atlantic unity have always presumed that Europe would be demoralized and divided by the withdrawal of U.S. security commitments. Now, however, it faces the prospect of a re-energized Europe, in which the Nordic-Baltic determination to deter Russia’s ambitions is backed by the collective leadership provided by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 26).

The Kremlin describes this dynamic as threatening Russia’s security and insists that a pause in combat operations would play into the hands of the European “war party.” Putin thus told submariners of the Northern Fleet to ignore the speculation about a “peace deal” (Kommersant, March 28). His plan for ending the war aims at defeating Ukraine, even if Russia’s relentless attacks yield diminishing territorial gains (The Insider, March 29). In Russian society, to the contrary, hopes for a swift end to the war are rising and fueling the uptick in positive outlooks (seeEDM, January 13;Re: Russia, March 28). In the economy, consumer confidence has increased, while inflation has decreased slightly, despite the decline in oil revenues, and the defense industry has exhausted its growth potential (The Moscow Times, March 28). A relaxation of the sanctions regime is the main focus of Moscow’s optimistic expectations, but sober voices are warning about numerous hurdles on the path to restoring a modicum of economic normalcy in Russia (Forbes.ru, March 28).

Pretense for readiness to bring the war to an end

Putin’s pretense for readiness to bring the war to an end is negated by his own war-mongering rhetoric (seeEDM, February 3). The Kremlin seeks to downplay this intransigence and to create incentives for bilateral Russia-U.S. rapprochement along other political and economic tracks, including the Arctic. The problem with this intrigue is that the failure to stop the deadly hostilities is plain and obvious, while the profits to be harvested from the vaguely outlined Arctic cooperation are hypothetical and mostly fictitious.

The enormous and sustained concentration of Russian economic and human resources on waging the war of attrition against Ukraine has been detrimental to its Arctic development plans. Launching new nuclear submarines is not a solution to the problems of deteriorating infrastructure, even in military bases. The neglect of accumulating ecological problems, including those resulting from nuclearization of the Arctic, generates risks that will inevitably undercut all geopolitical fantasies (seeEDM, March 4).

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor