In Elements of Deterrence, Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay provide a highly original and comprehensive theory of deterrence for the 21st century. They force scholars to recognize that the field’s understanding of deterrence has been heavily shaped by the Cold War-era nuclear competition. In fact, they argue deterrence is a broader basket of policies and objectives that includes coercion, defense, accommodation, and deception. They argue that there are tradeoffs among these goals. For example, visible demonstrations of military force may enhance coercion, but undermine deception. They further maintain that certain military technologies are better suited for some deterrence objectives than others. For example, nuclear weapons are effective tools of coercion, consistent with traditional nuclear deterrence theory, but cyber can be better utilized for deception, and space is preferable, by increasing transparency, for accommodation. They ground their theory in the bargaining model of war and test the argument in a range of quantitative and qualitative empirical investigations. The lesson for policymakers is that efforts to find an overall optimal ‘integrated deterrence’ strategy are bound to fail. There are tradeoffs, and the first step of formulating a coherent deterrence strategy and posture, therefore, is for policymakers to decide on their preferences. This is the authoritative scholarly work on ‘integrated deterrence’ and it should be read by government officials and scholars alike.