Controlling Territory, Controlling Voters presents a new theory for why electoral violence occurs in geographically polarized electoral systems where national level electoral majorities are nevertheless required to assume office. Two features are important: First, Wahman argues that in regionally polarized countries, parties need local presence to influence narratives and interpretations of political (or societal) events. Second, in such systems, elections at the national level are not (exclusively) won by swaying the sufficient margin of swing voters but by being able to mobilize supermajorities in strongholds on election day. Controlling the narrative, selling the party as the sole deliverer of regional interests, is central to such mobilization. Electoral violence is a tool to keep alternative voices out, and parties use it to establish ‘local autocracies’ of informational (and thus mobilizational) control. As a result, these systems are characterized by high national electoral competition, but relatively low local electoral competition. The book has several strengths. Notably, the argument puts forward an electoral role of electoral violence and links this to the more general theories on electoral behavior, from political cleavages to authoritarian control. Wahman brings his extensive knowledge on African politics to the table, which shines in the rich empirical chapters on Zambia and Malawi, although I see no reason why the argument could not be applied to similar systems outside of Africa. The book also inspires several questions. Are, for example, countries regionally polarized and therefore see incentives for territorial control, or does the combination of single-member legislatures with national-level executives create, or at least amplify, incentives for geographical polarization? I hope we will see future studies that further spell out the details in Wahman’s argument.